While recent work shows that characteristics of managers influence firm performance, evidence regarding the selection of managers into firms is scarce. This paper uses novel data from the labor market for MBA graduates to understand how these individuals search and compete for jobs. I find that candidates search harder if they have lower ability or worse outside options, the job sought is more valuable, or if firms are more likely to hire. Candidates self-select into positions for which they are better qualified and higher ability types choose to compete for better paying jobs, such as those in the financial industry. * I am grateful to
Introduction
Overall, the literature suggests that there is significant heterogeneity across managers in terms of skills and preferences, and that having the right manager in place is important for firm performance. The contribution of this paper is to provide evidence regarding the first stage of the matching process between firms and human capital by documenting how business professionals select into jobs.
The paper also complements the macroeconomics literature on search in labor markets (e.g., Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) ) by providing novel micro-level data regarding individuals' choice of effort for securing employment. The existing work on search and matching in the labor market assumes that employees either get matched with firms at random and the quality of the match is revealed over time, or they use a directed search approach by targeting firms that offer higher wages (Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) , Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) ).
3 This prior work captures macroeconomic phenomena such as the dynamics of unemployment and wages, but does not seek to identify the actual search behavior of workers. The evidence presented in this paper can shed light on the micro-level details of the process by which human capital is supplied to firms.
Two important decisions of managers that are not captured in the paper are whether to pursue an MBA degree, and what skills to acquire conditional on enrolling in an MBA program. Having an MBA degree has consequences for future wages and employment, since the training obtained in business school confers general human capital that is easily transferable across firms, and compensated in the labor market (Frydman (2005) , Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) ). Also, it is possible that the type of skills MBA students choose to acquire during business school depends on factors such as their perceptions of future economic conditions, which can be a determinant of job search outcomes. For example, Oyer (2008) shows that higher stock market returns in the year of graduation increase the MBAs' chance of success at becoming employed in investment banking. The analysis conducted here abstracts from these issues due to both data limitations, as well as the interest in focusing on the MBAs' job search strategies.
The results documented here show that there exists clear heterogeneity in the job search process and selection of business professionals into jobs. It is possible, however, that there also exists significant heterogeneity in how firms hire, as conjectured by Oyer and Schaefer (2011) . For example, Kuhnen and Oyer (2016) find that that uncertainty regarding how well job candidates fit with a firm's industry hinders hiring and that companies value probationary work arrangements that provide the option to learn more about potential full-time employees.
Future work is needed to further study the process by which firms decide whom to make offers to, conditional on the set of applications or candidates that they are faced with. This
shown to relate to CEO promotion decisions (Goel and Thakor (2008) ), firm financing choice (Hackbarth (2008) , and pay and investment decisions (Gervais and Goldstein (2007) , Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (forthcoming) ). Empirical evidence supports these implications (e.g., Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2009) ). 3 Early contributions in this literature include Jovanovic (1979) and Mortensen (1982) .
is an important process to understand, as theoretical and empirical work (e.g., Jovanovic (1979) , Allgood and Farrell (2003) , Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2010) ) shows that the degree to which firms make the right choice of managers determines the length and productivity of the employment relationship. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a model of job search effort in a tournament setting and Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 documents the empirical results, relating them to the predictions of the model, and Section 5 concludes.
Model
I will assume that two individuals seek employment and compete for the same job in a one-shot game. Let λ be the probability that a job offer will be made to either of the candidates, with higher values of this parameter indicating better economic conditions (e.g., a lower unemployment rate) at the time when the candidates apply for the job. If individual i ∈ {1, 2} does not get employed he will have an outside option with utility v i . This outside option captures, for instance, the value of any potential job offers that the candidate may get at a later time, or the value of an existing employment offer that the candidate already has obtained. The two candidates differ in their ability, which can be broadly interpreted as their human capital, either general or specific to the job they apply to. Let θ > 1 capture this ability difference, and without loss of generality, let agent 1 be the more able candidate. Then θ indicates how much more able agent 1 is relative to agent 2. Agents are also heterogeneous with respect to the amount of utility they would get if they got the job offer. 4 Let the utility agent i of being employed in this particular position be given by v i . I assume that
that is, agents prefer to be employed rather than take their outside option. Each agent i chooses how much effort e i to exert during the job application process in order to increase his chance of being hired. For instance, a candidate can spend more time polishing his resume, networking with employees from the recruiting firm, or studying topics that may be covered in the job interview. Effort is costly and causes the agent disutility equal to ce i , where c > 0. The ability difference θ and the effort exerted will influence the probability of "winning"(in this case, of obtaining the job offer). Conditional on the exogenous hiring probability λ, the probability that agent 1 gets the job offer is
and the probability that agent 2 gets the offer is
The two agents will simultaneously set the effort spent in the recruiting process. Agent i therefore solves the following problem:
It is easy to show that the resulting Nash equilibrium is characterized by the following effort levels:
and
From equilibrium conditions (4) and (5) we obtain the following comparative statics results:
and we also have that
The implications of the comparative statics in (6)-(8) are straightforward and intuitive: all else equal, a candidate will put more effort in his job application process if the cost of applying is lower, if the exogenous probability that hiring will in fact occur is higher, or if the utility from getting the job, relative to being left with the outside option, is higher.
The result given by (9) is a generalization of that obtained in prior models of contests with asymmetric players such as Baik (1994) , where both agents assign a value of 0 to their outside option, and they have the same value for being employed (i.e., v 1 = v 2 = 0 and
. Under these simplifying assumptions, both agents put less effort in the contest when the difference in ability between the two players is larger. The result is intuitive: if the better agent is much more able that the other player, he does not need to put in much effort to win the contest. The lower ability player understands that he stands a low chance of winning because he is far less able than the other person, and therefore will also exert a low effort level.
When there is heterogeneity in outside options and in the values that players assign to the job, as it is the case in my setup, equilibrium effort levels are decreasing in the ability difference θ if and only if the low ability candidate is not too keen on getting the job relative to the other agent (i.e., when v 2 − v 2 < θ(v 1 − v 1 )).
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Further, equation (10) indicates that if the lower ability agent 2 needs the job more than the higher ability agent 1 (i.e., if v 2 −v 2 > v 1 −v 1 ), then he will in fact work harder during the recruiting process than agent 1. This will happen, for instance, when the outside option v 2 of the low ability candidate is particularly bad. The empirical evidence in Hines, Hoynes, and Krueger (2002) and Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2006) suggests this is the case, at least during economic recessions, as lower ability workers are less able to secure employment. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that lower types benefit from getting the job (relative to taking their outside option) more than higher types. This simple framework therefore yields the following testable predictions:
Proposition 1 All else equal, a job candidate will put more effort into the recruiting process when the marginal cost c of applying is lower, his value for the job v i is higher, his outside option v i is lower, or the unconditional probability λ that hiring will occur is higher. The highest effort will be exerted by the candidate who needs the job more, i.e., who has the highest
Once it is known what the equilibrium effort levels are given the players' valuations v i , i ∈ {1, 2}, of a particular job and the talent difference θ, it is natural to inquire which jobs individuals will choose to compete for. Let Π than the competition, and from which he and the competition would get utility v 1 and v 2 , respectively. It can be shown that for all positive values of θ and of v 1 − v 1 :
Therefore, we have the following additional prediction:
5 Simple algebra shows that
Proposition 2 Candidates will choose to compete for jobs for which they are relatively more qualified (i.e., for which they have higher θ) and from which they derive higher utility (i.e., jobs that offer them a higher v i ), keeping all other parameters and the competitors the same across jobs.
As a caveat, the model makes the simplifying assumption that candidates apply to one job and decide how much effort to exert during the application process. Nonetheless, the intuition of the results obtained here would carry in a setting where a candidate must determine which n jobs to apply to out of N openings, and can only take one offer from a set of possibly multiple offers. Solving for the optimal set of jobs one should seek is not trivial when applications are costly, as this problem requires maximizing a sub-modular function of finite sets. For simple specifications of the job payoff and application cost function, Chade and Smith (2006) (who study high school students' choice of college applications) propose a greedy algorithm that finds the optimal set of opportunities a candidate should pursue. The comparative statics their model would yield in the context of job search are two-fold: if the application costs are higher, candidates will apply to fewer jobs, and if the probability of getting an offer for each job opening increases (perhaps because the employers become keener to fill vacancies because the economic conditions are better and production is more valuable), then applicants are more "aggressive", in the sense that they are more likely to apply to long-shot jobs (i.e., those positions that are highly desirable but difficult to get). Similar predictions, though, are also obtained in the simplified framework presented here, where the decision is about how much effort candidates choose to put in the recruiting process, for instance either by improving their resume or by networking with representatives of the firms in which they are interested.
Data
The data were obtained from the career management office at a top business school in the U.S. and provide detailed information about the demographics (age, gender, country of residence, undergraduate degree), work experience, GMAT score, grades, on-campus club memberships, job applications and job offers of students enrolled in the two-year full-time those that conducted their recruiting on campus. Finally, for the class of 2006 I only know the job offers received by students, but do not know the complete set of firms they applied to. Since the paper is focused on job search strategies I will limit the analysis to data from the cohorts graduating in 2007 through 2010, since for those individuals I know their job application history.
Students can apply to obtain an interview slot during on-campus recruiting in two stages. In the first stage, referred to as "closed", they can submit resumes to companies that will offer on-campus recruiting. Employers then select whom to invite for interviews based on students' resumes only. This process is costless to students. In a second stage, called the "open" or "bidding" system, students can bid a limited number of points (out of an annual endowment of 800 points) to obtain an interview slot. Therefore, in this second stage obtaining an interview with a desired employer is costly to the student. The data set contains all the bids that each student placed for interview slots for either internships or full-time jobs, as well as information about whether or not the bids were successful (i.e., higher or equal to the clearing bid for that contest). On-campus recruiting for full-time positions occurs at the beginning of the students' second year in the MBA program, between September and December. On-campus recruiting for summer internships occurs during the January-March period of the students' first year in the MBA program. For both types of positions recruiting occurs in multiple rounds, each of them lasting one week, with each company recruiting in one round only. Bidding takes place sequentially, first for interviews with companies in the first round (i.e., those present on campus during the first week of interviews), and then for companies in each of the subsequent rounds. Before students send in any applications or bid any points, they know the full on-campus recruiting schedule, that is, which companies will be interviewing in each round, and how many closed and open slots they have available.
I complement these data with a measure of employer prestige, using the Fortune MBA 100 annual rankings, which are typically published in May. If a firm is ranked in the top 100 according to these surveys, then I will refer to it a prestigious employer. 6 I also collect data on the prestige of the undergraduate institution that each student attended, using the word-wide college ranking compiled by QS Top Universities in 2008. 7 For each college that the individuals in my sample went to I determine whether it is a top 100 school using these rankings.
In the analysis I use several measures of a job seeker's ability, namely their GMAT score, their GPA while in business school, whether they attended a top 100 undergraduate institution, and the seniority of the job held immediately prior to starting their MBA degree. To measure the seniority of a position, one can compare its salary to the average salary in the industry. Unfortunately, the data set does not contain salary information for jobs held prior to the MBA program, but it does specify the exact titles of those jobs. I therefore estimate job seniority using these job titles in conjunction with a seniority-assignment algorithm I develop using data from the website GlassDoor.com. This website has salary information for numerous job titles across companies in various industries, reported by multiple individuals holding similar positions. I form the set of all individual keywords that compose these job titles (e.g., "manager", "executive", "VP", "assistant", "sales" or "engineer"), and for each keyword I find the average salary in each industry for jobs whose titles contain it. This process allows me to assign a dollar value (or equivalently, a level of importance, or seniority) to each word that appears in a person's job title, in any industry. I then use these keyword values to estimate the seniority of the job title held by each individual in my sample before they started the MBA program.
Results

Choosing effort during job search: Tests of Proposition 1
If the cost of effort is lower, all else equal, more effort is exerted (
Given the structure of the on-campus recruiting process that the individuals in the sample face, this prediction is easily testable. Students can initially send applications at no cost to companies that have interview slots on campus, and the companies will pick those candidates they like best to populate the "closed" slots (i.e., closed to bidding). After the closed slots are filled up, students are informed whether or not they were successful at getting interviews and can then bid costly points to get "open" interview slots (i.e., open to bidding). Therefore, the model predicts that students should apply to more positions during the closed and costless they will be sending out fewer applications at that time. This interpretation can be rejected, however, because the process of bidding for interviews (i.e., the costly application stage) occurs before companies interview any of the candidates, and therefore, before any offers are made.
If the exogenous probability of hiring is higher, all else equal, more search effort is exerted (
To test this, I compare the search effort by candidates looking for jobs in good economic times versus those recruiting in bad economic times, while keeping constant their outside option (v i ). Hence, I will analyze only those candidates that have a full-time offer already that resulted from an internship or a prior full-time employer, and therefore face a high, and relatively similar across people, outside option value v i . The only difference then between the two groups of searchers is the value of λ they face: high for those recruiting in good times, low for the others.
I find that in bad economic times (low λ), a higher fraction of those with an existing full-time offer will accept it and will search little or not at all during the fall recruiting season, compared to those searching in good times (high λ). As can be seen in Figure 2 , 7% fewer students who have an offer already from an internship or a prior employer go through the on-campus recruiting season for full-time jobs during bad economic conditions (i.e., class of 2009) than during good economic conditions (i.e., class of 2007). This difference is significantly different from zero (p < 0.05). Of the students with an existing offer, members of class of 2007 apply on-campus to 5.98 jobs on average, whereas members of class of 2009 apply to 5.03 jobs on average (the difference of the means is significant from zero at p < 0.1). Hence, those with good outside options are less likely to search any further in bad times, and more likely to simply take the outside option. As additional support for this prediction, Figure 3 shows that of the students with an existing offer, 83.33% decide to accept it if they are part of the class of 2009 but only 63.18% accept it if they are part of the class of 2007. For the class of 2008, the outside option acceptance rate is in between these values, at 76.25%. As implied by Proposition 1, these results therefore indicate that conditional on having a valuable outside option, candidates put significantly less effort in their search in times when hiring is less likely, i.e., when λ is smaller.
An alternative interpretation of these results is that there are systematic differences in terms of ability between class of 2007 and class of 2009 candidates who have secured offers before the full-time recruiting season. Specifically, class of 2009 candidates with existing offers are of higher caliber than those in class of 2007, perhaps because firms are more selective when making offers to their summer interns during tough economic times. If that was the case, then class of 2009 candidates with a good outside option may optimally apply to fewer jobs during the on-campus recruiting process because they have higher ability and thus a better chance for their applications to be successful. This alternative hypothesis, nonetheless, is not supported by the data, as the GPA of the class of 2009 candidates with existing offers is 3.50, while for class of 2007 candidates it is 3.53. The difference is not statistically significant, and it is of the opposite sign relative to the prediction of this alternative account.
To complete the test of the implication that the hiring probability λ changes search effort, it is necessary to show that it is indeed the case that in bad economic times (fall 2008-spring 2009) λ is smaller, that is, the probability that somebody is hired (conditional on companies conducting recruiting) is lower in bad times. One way to verify whether λ is smaller in bad times is to look at the number of offers per student. I find that the average number of offers per candidate is 1.51 for the class of 2007, 1.37 for the class of 2008 and 0.99 for the class of 2009. The distribution of the number of offers that students receive is presented in Figure   4 . Consistent with the result that the average number of full-time job offers per candidate is much lower for the cohort recruiting in bad times (class of 2009) relative to that recruiting in good times (class of 2007), Figure 4 shows that in bad times the fraction of candidates with two or more offers is less than half than in good times, whereas the fraction of people with zero or just one offer is significantly higher.
Note that bad economic times can mean both a lower λ, as well as a lower value of the outside option v i . The overall effect of economic conditions on search effort is therefore determined by the opposing influence of these two parameters. If λ is lower, effort is not that productive and therefore search should be less intense. However, if v i is also low, not searching leads for sure to a bad outside option, and this in turn can overcome the effect that a low λ has on search intensity. Hence, those candidates with bad outside options, who are those without an existing offer from a prior workplace, may in fact search with higher intensity if they are part of a cohort recruiting in bad times, relative to those recruiting in good times. 9 Confirming this prediction, I find that on average class of 2007 students with no existing offers apply to 9.73 jobs, class of 2008 students apply to 10.55 jobs, and class of 2009 students apply to 13.95 jobs during on-campus full-time recruiting. These means are significantly different at p < 0.01.
If the value of the outside option is lower, all else equal, more search effort is 9 In the macroeconomics literature on search and unemployment (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) ) it is difficult to obtain the theoretical prediction that workers search with higher intensity in bad economic times. However, as Shimer (2004) shows, unemployed workers search harder during recessions. Shimer (2004) proposes a general equilibrium model of unemployment where workers can send simultaneously many job applications and finds that workers with high chances of getting a job respond to adverse macroeconomic shocks by increasing search intensity. Intuitively, because a worker can only accept one job offer even if many are received, the marginal benefit of sending an additional application is higher in bad times, when the worker may have zero offers, than in good times, when he may already have several. The model I present here has a similar intuition, which is that because job candidates' outside options are less valuable in bad economic times, they will search more to find employment. exerted (
As before, I identify full-time job candidates with better outside options as those who have a full-time offer from a summer internship or a former employer. In Table 1 I estimate a probit model of the probability that a student will choose to participate in the on-campus full-time recruiting process that occurs during the September-December period each year. I include class fixed effects to account for the influence of economic conditions at the time of recruiting on the search process. The results in Table 1 show that individuals who have a full-time offer from a summer internship or from a former full-time employer are 14%, and respectively 23%, less likely to participate in the on-campus recruiting in the fall of their second year of MBA studies. Moreover, conditional on going through on-campus recruiting for full-time jobs, candidates will apply to fewer positions if they have an offer from an internship already, as indicated by the summary statistics in Table 2 . Those without an existing offer apply on average to 11 jobs, while those with an offer from a prior work place apply to about 6 jobs (the difference is significant at p < 0.01). Table 2 also shows that students that have an outstanding offer have higher ability, as measured by their GPA, than those without offers prior to the full-time recruiting season, suggesting that ability and outside options are positively correlated.
In Table 3 I estimate OLS models predicting two measures of search effort, or breadth:
the number of applications sent by each student separately for internships and full-time jobs, and the industry concentration of these applications. To compute the latter measure of search effort, for each student and job type (internship or full-time) I calculate the percentage of applications sent to jobs in each of the following six broad industry areas: consulting, finance, general corporations, government/non-profit, other services (which mainly include law firms) and technology. I then define the index of industry concentration of the student's application portfolio as the maximum of these six percentages. For instance, an industry concentration index of 1 means that the candidate sent all applications to jobs in only one of these six broad industry areas. An index of 0.6 indicates that the candidate sent 60% of applications to jobs in one particular industry, while the remaining 40% were sent to positions in the other five industries.
In the regressions in Table 3 I include as independent variables measures of outside option value (i.e., do they have an offer from a summer internship or from a prior full-time employers) and proxies for the human capital of the candidate (i.e., their GMAT score, GPA in business school, whether or not they attended a top 100 undergraduate institution and the seniority of their pre-business school position). I control for the industry that the searcher seems most interested in (i.e., the broad industry area to which the candidate sends the most applications), and include class fixed effects to account for variations in the economic conditions during the recruiting season. In line with the univariate results documented before, I find that candidates that have already a full-time offer from an internship or a prior employer search less during the fall on-campus recruiting process, in both the costless and the costly stage. Individuals with valuable outside options apply to about four fewer jobs in the costless stage and two fewer jobs in the costly stage compared to other candidates that have similar industry interests and human capital, and are seeking employment at the same time. Moreover, the search of candidates with existing offers is significantly more focused, as the industry concentration index of their portfolio of applications is 10% higher than that of candidates without an outstanding full-time offer.
As discussed earlier, it is likely that outside options of candidates going through full-time job recruiting in bad economic times are worse than those of candidates recruiting in good times. As a result, candidates have the incentive to put more effort in the search process in bad times, even though the exogenous hiring probability λ may be smaller then, to avoid being left with a low v i . I find that indeed, across all candidates who chose to participate in on-campus recruiting for either internships or full-time jobs (and therefore likely do not have valuable outside options), the search is broader in bad economic times than in good times, as shown be the evidence in Table 4 . The average number of internship applications per student is 20 for class of 2007, and 23 for class of 2010, while the industry concentration index drops from 0.72 to 0.65. Hence, even looking at searches for internships, the overall effect of tough economic conditions is an increase in the number of applications and in the diversity of industries a candidate is willing to consider. Table 4 also documents similar effects for the case of searching for full-time jobs.
As a further test of the prediction that those with worse outside options will put more effort in the job search, I analyze the bids submitted by candidates interested in winning interviews during the open stage of recruiting. Arguably, those who are still bidding for interviews in later rounds have not yet received acceptable offers, and therefore face worse outside options than those bidding in earlier rounds. This effect is indeed seen in the data. Figure 5 shows that those still bidding in late stages of the recruiting process spend significantly more points per bid than those bidding in earlier stages. Note, however, that this can simply be the result of approaching the end game, that is, the end of bidding, when points become useless. I will return to this point later in the subsection.
Lower types will exert more effort than higher types if they benefit more from the job (e 2 > e 1 ⇐⇒ v 2 − v 2 > v 1 − v 1 ).
As argued earlier, empirical evidence in extant papers supports the idea that lower ability people have much more to gain from getting the job, since their outside option is worse than that of higher types. For instance, Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2006) shows that low ability workers are those who are hurt most in recessions. Hence, the prediction of the model is that lower ability individuals will search harder. The results in the OLS regression models in Table 3 are consistent with this prediction. Higher ability candidates, as measured by their GPA during business school or the prestige of the undergraduate degree institution they attended, apply to fewer positions in both the closed and open recruiting stages and have a higher industry concentration index than lower ability candidates.
10 For instance, increasing a candidate's GPA by 1 point (out of 4 possible) leads to a decrease of about 4 applications for either internships or full-time jobs, for both the costless and costly recruiting stages, and to an increase in the industry concentration index of the portfolio of applications of 4% for internships and 7% for full-time jobs. I do not find a significant effect of the candidates' seniority in the job held prior to starting graduate school and the breadth of their search. While data items such as the GPA, GMAT score or the prestige of the undergraduate institution attended are proxies for the general human capital of the individual, industry-or firm-specific human capital is also important for getting the job. In the context of the model, the parameter θ encompasses the overall fit of the candidate for the job, which depends on his general as well as his industry-or firm-specific human capital. To test whether the latter component is also a driver of search breadth, as the model would predict, in the regressions in Table 3 I include a dummy variable for whether the candidate is an industry switcher. This indicator takes the value of one if the person searches mainly in a broad industry area (of the six mentioned above) that is not the same as the broad industry area they worked in right before enrolling in the MBA program. For example, an individual with a background in consulting who dedicates the highest number of his applications to finance jobs is categorized as an industry switcher. A person can be an industry switcher during the internship search, but may be a non-switcher during the full-time job search if during that process they apply mainly to jobs in the broad industry area they came from when they started the MBA degree. The opposite can also happen. If the person is not engaged in on-campus job search, I characterize them as a switcher or non-switcher by comparing the broad industry of the job they accepted to that of the job they had right before starting graduate school.
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Using the notation of the model, an industry switcher has a lower value of ability or fit with the job θ, compared to a non-switcher. Therefore, the model predicts that industry switching candidates will conduct a broader search than non-switchers.
12 The results of the regression models in Table 3 are consistent with this prediction. Switchers apply to two more internship positions, and to one more full-time position than non-switchers, and have an industry concentration index that is between 3% and 5% lower. These differences are statistically significant at conventional levels.
If the value of the job is higher, more effort is expended (
. Some jobs are more coveted than others, that is, they have a higher value of v i . For instance, it is arguably better to start one's post-MBA career by joining a more prestigious firm, as this offers better opportunities in terms of career mobility. At the same time, a job that offers more responsibility and higher pay is likely to be seen as more valuable. Hence, the model would predict that candidates will expend more effort when a more prestigious or better paid job is at stake. This prediction is in fact confirmed by the bidding behavior of students in the open stage of recruiting for both internships and full-time jobs, as seen in the regression models in Table 5 . Bids placed for interviews with prestigious companies are 71 points higher than those for non-prestigious companies in the case of internships, and 95 points higher in the case of full-time jobs. If the average starting salary in the company providing the interview is $10,000 higher, bids will be 16 points higher for internships, and 10 points higher in the case of full-time jobs.
In these regressions I include broad industry fixed effects, as well as fixed effects for the round when the bid is placed to account for time trends in the value assigned by candidates to jobs relative to the available outside options, since those bidding in late rounds likely have a low outside option and nothing to lose by spending all their points. I find that the highest bids are those placed for interviews in the consulting and finance industries.
Moreover, confirming the univariate findings in Figure 5 , bids increase significantly from round to round. Bids placed in round five are on average almost 150 points higher than bids placed in round one. As discussed earlier, this result can be interpreted as either indicating that those participating in later rounds are more concerned, since the end of recruiting season is nearer, or as simply saying that saving points for later is less valuable towards the end of recruiting. The bid regression model for full-time job interviews in Table 5 also shows that those who have an offer already from a prior workplace submit on average higher bids than the other candidates. This effect is consistent with the results documented earlier that students who have an offer already but choose to participate in on-campus recruiting for full-time jobs will apply to fewer positions. Since they will bid for fewer interview slots (and start with the same endowment of 800 points like everybody else), then the average bid of these candidate with a valuable outside option is bound to be higher.
As additional evidence that more effort is put into job search if the value of getting the job is higher, I find that when applying for internships, candidates are significantly broader in their search than when applying to full-time positions. This effect can be seen for instance in Table 4 . Arguably, applying to more internships allows the candidate to explore and learn about more companies or industries. This exploratory behavior embeds an option-like payoff, more so than what one would get by applying to a full-time job a year later. Note that this empirical pattern can also be driven by
, that is, recruiting for internships may be less costly, but this is a doubtful assertion. Candidates have to network and prepare for interviews in both situations, and thus the marginal cost of effort could easily be the same for both internships and full-time recruiting.
An alternative explanation for why candidates apply to more internships than full-time positions is that there may be more numerous relevant internship positions available to a student than full-time jobs. The data allow me to distinguish between this explanation of search based on changes in the available set of interesting jobs, and the one based on the existence of an embedded option-like payoff in internship search. If candidates apply to fewer full-time jobs than internships because there are fewer interesting full-time jobs to compete for, this does not predict that full-time applications will be more or less concentrated in a particular industry compared to internship applications. However, if the change in search is due to a difference in the value of internships versus full-time jobs, with internships having the additional option payoff of exploring new areas, then we expect to see workers be more likely to apply to industries different from their background during the internship search than during the full-time job search. To test this prediction, I compare the industry switching behavior of all students during both internship and full-time recruiting. The fraction of candidates in class of 2007, 2008 and 2009 who are classified as industry switchers during internship recruiting is 63.43%, whereas for full-time job recruiting the fraction of switchers is only 52.80%. This decrease in industry switching behavior of about 10% between the two stages of recruiting is also present within each of the three classes, thus alleviating concerns that it may be just be driven by changes in the economic environment faced by the cohorts studied here. The evidence therefore indicates that candidates are indeed more likely to search outside the industry they came from when joining the MBA program during internship recruiting than during recruiting for full-time jobs, as the model would predict.
Choosing where to apply: Tests of Proposition 2
Candidates will tend to apply to jobs for which they are better qualified (i.e., for which they have a higher value of θ) and that they find more valuable (i.e., that have a higher value of v i ).
Proposition 2 implies that there should be a correlation between the type of courses taken (e.g., finance versus technology) or extracurricular activities pursued (e.g., membership in the IBanking club or the BioTech club) and what type of job the student will apply to. If a student takes more finance courses and belongs to more finance-related clubs on campus, for instance, this suggests that he is more prepared for finance jobs than others and therefore has a higher θ in the contest for finance jobs, but also, that he values working in this industry more than his competitors. As expected, I find that the type of job a candidate will apply to is predicted by the type of classes he takes, and his on-campus club memberships, as indicated by him being on these club's email lists. These effects are illustrated in Figures 6 and 7 . For instance, individuals who apply to jobs in finance take on average 3-5 more finance classes and are members of 2-3 more finance clubs on campus, than individuals who apply to jobs in each of the other industry areas (p < 0.01). Similar patterns hold for job applicants to consulting positions, government/non-profit positions, technology or general corporation positions (e.g., consumer goods/marketing). While Proposition 2 states that people will prefer to compete for jobs they value more, it is important to keep in mind that this result refers to the choice made by a candidate between two job contests keeping the same across contests the relative ability of the candidate (his θ in each contest) and his competitors' valuation of the job (v j − v j , j = i). A question that arises naturally, then, is how candidates choose contests in situations when a higher v i also implies a higher v j , j = i, for instance, when all applicants prefer a job with higher salary over one with lower salary. For instance, one may inquire whether it is the case that those students with high ability apply to jobs in high paying industries, and those with low ability apply to jobs in industries characterized by lower wages. In these cases, equilibria may arise where for both the low paying job as well as for the high paying job the set of competitors will be a mix of high and low ability types. The intuition of this result is that competing head-to-head for a well-paid job with another applicant with high ability has a low chance of success, whereas competing with a low ability candidate for a low paying job has a much higher chance of leading to an offer. It is possible, therefore, that in expectation one is better off choosing to compete against weaker adversaries for a low value outcome, than choosing to apply for a more coveted job. Hence, the model does not have an unconditional prediction whether there should be a positive correlation between ability and the salary or prestige of the jobs people apply to, or, in other words, that only high types apply to the best jobs. For certain regions of the parameter space (if, for instance, the high paid jobs are much more valuable to high types than the low paid jobs), it is possible to have positive assortative selection of types into contests, whereas for other regions the types will be uniformly distributed across contests. The evidence presented in Table 6 shows that in fact there is self-selection into contests based on ability. I focus on contest choices made during the costly, open bid stage of recruiting, when candidates must bid points to try to win an interview time slot for a particular job, but similar effects are seen in contests involving costless applications. I find that a significantly higher number of candidates participate in contests for jobs in higher paying companies (defined as those paying average starting salaries over $100,000 to individuals in the data set) or more prestigious ones, and candidates bid on average more points in these contests. Relative to jobs in low paying companies, those in high paying companies attract 3.88 more bidders, and receive bids that are on average 20.81 points higher (p < 0.01). Similarly, jobs in prestigious firms attract 11.88 more bidders, and receive bids higher by 55.64 points, relative to jobs in other firms (p < 0.01).
Contests for jobs in high paying companies attract pools of candidates that not only are more numerous than those participating in contests for low paying jobs, as indicated by the number of applicants (overall, or per job offer or interview slot), but also are of higher average quality as measured by their GPA (0.03 points difference, p < 0.01) or GMAT score (5.70 points difference, p < 0.01).
13 The data also indicates that high paying jobs tend to be found in particular industries, specifically in finance, consulting or technology, where average base salaries are 6%-18% higher than the average base salary for jobs in other types of corporations (p < 0.01). These results complement the findings in Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2005) who find that high-wage sectors such as finance and business services employ high-skill workers and offer high returns to workers' skills. My results show that one channel through which this effect occurs is the self-selection of higher types into these industries with higher-paying jobs, from the beginning of these individuals' post-MBA career path. The statistics presented in Table 6 indicate that there are strong gender effects in contest selection. The fraction of bids for interviews submitted by men is 72% in the case of high paying companies, and only 65% for low paying ones (the difference is significant at p < 0.01).
Therefore, men are more likely to compete in contests for better paid jobs, whereas women are more likely to apply to lower paid positions. These results suggest that there may be gender-based self-selection into jobs in particular industries that differ in terms of wages.
14 Indeed, in my sample, men represent 76% of applicants to finance jobs, 66% of applicants to consulting jobs and 63% of applicants to technology jobs, and only 50% of applicants to positions in general corporations. Hence, men are more likely to choose to compete in contests for jobs in industries that offer better pay. These results complement earlier findings regarding the existence of a gender wage gap later in the careers of MBA graduates (Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010) ) by suggesting that part of the gap is driven by gender differences in the types of jobs these individuals pursue at the onset of their post-MBA career.
Conclusion
Recent theoretical and empirical work shows that characteristics of managers are significant determinants of firm outcomes, indicating that it is important to have the right people work for the right firms. Nonetheless, little is known about the process by which managers search for or select into jobs. This paper seeks to address this gap in the literature by studying how managerial talent is supplied to firms. I use a novel data set that contains detailed information about the characteristics and job search strategies of more than 2,000 MBA graduates from a top U.S. business school. I find that candidates competing for employment increase their job search effort if the cost of effort is lower, the likelihood that firms will hire increases, their outside option is worse, the job sought is more valuable, or if their ability is lower. Candidates apply to positions for which they are better qualified, while higher ability types are more likely to choose to participate in contests for higher paying jobs, for instance those in the financial industry. There also exists a significant gender effect, with men being more likely to compete in contests for better paid positions. The contribution of this paper therefore is to provide evidence regarding the first stage of the matching process between firms and human capital by documenting how business professionals select into jobs. The second stage consists of the process by which firms decide what type of managers, or human capital in general, to invest in given the available supply of candidates. Just as this paper documents significant heterogeneity in how managers with different characteristics select into jobs, it is likely that firms which are different in terms of size, industry, or project type will exhibit heterogeneity with respect to the distribution of managerial talent they seek to employ. This may be a fruitful avenue for future research. Figure 6 : GPA and number of classes taken, by academic area and industry area of job sought. For students who never take classes in a particular area (e.g., finance), their GPA and number of classes for that area are set to equal zero (i.e., they are not treated as missing observations). The industry areas spanned by the jobs sought are consulting, finance, general corporations, government & non-profit, other services (composed of mainly law firms), and technology. 
